




## **Peaceful Communities Initiative**



**January-March 2004  
Quarterly Report**

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## **I. Overview of USAID's Peaceful Communities Initiative (PCI) Program**

The Peaceful Communities Initiative is a three-year USAID \$3.3 million funded project that has been operating since October 2001, in Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan, the three republics that share the Ferghana Valley. PCI's aim is to reduce inter-ethnic and trans-border conflict through a combination of social and infrastructure projects driven by local Community Initiative Groups (CIGs). Through such projects, PCI strives to bring communities together to address common problems to improve the quality of life in communities across national, ethnic, gender and age boundaries, and to increase the ability of communities to identify sources of conflict and participate in a constructive dialogue to generate and implement sustainable solutions.

PCI is implemented through a partnership of local and international NGOs: ICA-EHIO and Ittifok in Tajikistan; Mehr, Fido and the Business Women's Association of Kokand in Uzbekistan; the Foundation for Tolerance International in Kyrgyzstan; and Mercy Corps in all three countries. Members of these partner organizations work together in six field teams of mixed ethnicity and gender. These six field teams work in six different regions of the Ferghana Valley between the cities of Khujand and Osh, taking a grassroots community development approach to conflict prevention. The intentional mixture of ethnicities and nationalities within each field team is critical for earning the trust of the diverse populations they serve and maintaining an unbiased approach to understanding and addressing community problems in this complicated region. The fundamental approach of the project is to involve a large number of stakeholders from rural communities in border areas in the decision-making process that will lead to social and infrastructure projects designed to reduce tension over scarce resources and increase peaceful contact and communication.

## **II. Introduction**

This report covers Peaceful Communities Initiative activities from January through March of 2004. During this period, a wide variety of activities and initiatives were undertaken in order to address the following objectives, as stated in the cooperative agreement:

- A. Improve environment for inter-community cooperation and partnership through access and exchange of information and peer networking.*
- B. Increase abilities of communities to identify sources of conflict and participate in constructive dialogue to generate and implement solutions*

This report highlights examples of how PCI villages have addressed conflict or tensions in our communities, and made progress towards the aforementioned objectives. During the period of the report, PCI held 19 social and skills building projects, and 24 ongoing or completed infrastructure projects. A list of infrastructure and social projects during the period of this report can be found in Appendices C and D. During the period of this report, USAID's PCI program had the following media coverage: 10 radio spots, 3 television, 11 newspaper, 7 electronic list serves for a total of 31 spots covering the project, at the local and national level. Media results can be found in the Appendix E of this report.

This report begins with an overview of the indicator results from PCI's logical framework and followed by specific activities to illustrate how PCI is addressing the aforementioned objectives.<sup>1</sup> As in previous reports, sections on coordination activities and the changing political environment in the Ferghana Valley are also included.

In addition, of special note, is a case study, which can be found in Appendix A, which was written to assist USAID in better understanding the complexity and the different layers of potential for conflict in a PCI cluster of communities on the Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan border. This case study was undertaken to take one step closer to the daily reality at the community level opposed to reports by the International Crisis Group, Brookings Institute, and other international organizations that largely focus on the macro level issues in this period of transition. The report highlights how differing political and economic reforms in Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan are affecting citizens living in border communities.

### **III. Indicator Results from PCI Logframe**

In the summer of 2003, the PCI team put together a logical framework that included objectives, activities, and indicators to improve PCI's ability to measure its overall goal to reduce the potential for conflict in the Ferghana Valley. None of the indicators in the logframe individually demonstrate a reduction in the potential for conflict, but analyzed together, they provide evidence that tensions have been reduced by improving relations between ethnic groups, across borders, and local governments (between communities and local government, and governments across international borders). The PCI logical framework and recent results can be found in Appendix B of this report. Below is a brief narrative of the results to date.

#### *Improved Cooperation between Ethnic Groups and Across International Boundaries*

Increased inter-ethnic and cross-border activities contribute to improving trust and tolerance among residents, and improved trust and cooperation in turn contributes to increased stability in the region, making it less likely that ethnic or national divisions will provide the fuel for violent conflict. To date, there have been 161 social projects implemented during PCI. Over 80 social projects have involved more than two ethnic groups, including sports leagues, seminars for women's empowerment, international summer camps, Victory Day celebrations for veterans of different ethnicities, social theater, Navruz celebrations, trainings on water conservation, and chess tournaments. In addition, a testament to the strength and acceptance of the community mobilization process, 37 multi-community social projects were developed by CIGs outside of the PCI framework (without USAID funding).

Of the 72 infrastructure projects to date, approximately 90% of them provide services to multi-ethnic populations, cross-border, or to mono-ethnic minority communities (i.e. an ethnic Tajik community in Uzbekistan). In addition, there have been seven multi-community infrastructure projects, such as irrigation, drinking water, and natural gas projects. Since this type of project usually addresses a concrete source of tension (often transborder), these projects are clearly the most difficult, requiring villagers from neighboring communities to put aside their differences, and work together.

#### *Increased Community Participation in Identifying and Resolving Local Priorities Utilizing Local Resources and Skills*

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<sup>1</sup> This logical framework is an unofficial document created to measure PCI's overall goal to reduce the potential for conflict in the Ferghana Valley.

The PCI process is community-driven, led by Community Initiative Groups. All projects require at least a 25% match funding. This match requirement promotes the selection of projects that residents value as being high priority. Additionally, having communities use their own resources promotes the sustainability of projects. This match also increases the complexity of projects, requiring constant dialogue and cooperation between various stakeholders and resulting in improved mutual understanding. To date, community contribution/match for all PCI infrastructure projects is 38%.

PCI has placed a priority on creating sustainable management plans for projects that have a pricing mechanism for operation and maintenance (natural gas projects, drinking water, bath houses, school heating systems, etc). This has been done by establishing formal and informal organizations that can collect user fees, such as water committees to maintain drinking water systems<sup>2</sup>. To date, residents in PCI communities have a payment rate of 70% for services provided under the project, and seven associations have been formally registered. A majority of these associations serve multi-ethnic populations and provide an outlet for citizens to vent their complaints about poor service.

*Increased Community-Based Advocacy and Government Support of Community Driven Initiatives*  
One of the major sources of tension in PCI communities is the widely held perception that government does not serve all segments of the population equally, and is not responsive to local needs. More often than not, this is the result of little or no communication between government and the villages. PCI has promoted CIGs and community residents to advocate to their representative government officials for assistance in PCI projects. This advocacy has resulted in a large amount of government contribution. Local governments have contributed to 95% of PCI's 72 infrastructure projects. This partnership during implementation is a step forward in breaking down the perception that government representatives are indifferent. In addition, 10 projects identified as community priorities were addressed with the support of local government as a result of CIGs advocating their needs to local government outside of the PCI project framework (these have included construction of child care centers, health clinics, and providing land for sports fields). Additionally, communities are now reaching out to local government representatives and inviting them to attend all social events. Of the 161 social projects that PCI has held, a local government representative has attended 74% of the projects. Though often symbolic, this is another sign of improved government support for these communities.

#### **IV. Improve Environment for Inter-community Cooperation and Partnership**

##### *Open Borders*

During the period of this report, PCI began a 5 month project "Open Borders" with an Osh based NGO, Ferghana Valley Lawyers Without Borders (FVLWB). The project focuses on the legal issues related to borders in four PCI border communities, Kyrgyz-Kyshtak and Kaytpas (Kyrgyzstan) and Borbalyk and Katput (Uzbekistan), a cluster of communities where PCI has worked over the past two years. This cluster of communities has a high level of tension, much of it related to border issues. Several ethnic Kyrgyz herders were killed by Uzbekistan border guards several years ago and tensions continue between youth, resulting from cattle rustling and crop stealing across the border and between ethnic groups. In addition, all residents face a high

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<sup>2</sup> For example for drinking water projects, PCI has had grants with partner NGOs and trainings funded by AED on the development of water committees, and a project funded by DFID "Women and Water" focused promoting women's role in water committees. These activities are in addition to the daily monitoring provided by the PCI Teams.

level of corruption (bribes) when crossing the borders to markets. PCI has focused on numerous youth activities to reduce tension; this intervention with FVLWB was developed to specifically address border issues.

The project is conducting seminars, roundtable discussions, and trainings to increase the empowerment of community residents and raising their level of awareness to defend their legal rights and have greater confidence in their own capability to try to resolve issues related to:

- Customs Services
- Border Regulations
- Water Rights
- Police Officials

In each community, an initial community meeting was held to identify the main areas of concern to the community residents. Based on the feedback received, two trainings/focus group sessions were held in each community. These sessions offered residents the opportunity to discuss their concerns with a specialist, on the respective subject of each group, (residents were divided into small working groups based on each of the topics above), who provided an expert analysis of the situation, training regarding citizens' rights concerning this subject, and assisted the citizens in developing recommendations as to how to resolve their issues.

Following the training/focus group sessions in each community, two national round-table discussions were held (one in each country) bringing together the communities of Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan, separately, in order to develop a consensus on the recommendations that they wanted to put forward at the international round-table. An international round-table was held bringing together representatives of all four communities in order to develop a community based plan of action toward resolving mutually identified issues and working group which would be charged with leading the communities to the realization of this plan. Further, at this round-table, participants developed a list of recommendations which they are to present to their respective government officials at the international conference which will be held the last week in May.

The project is empowering citizens to be able to better defend their legal rights, via increased knowledge of the law and mobilization. For people who frequently cross the border for work and social reasons, this empowerment has made a tangible difference in their daily lives. Reducing the amount of bribes they have to pay to border guards, customs officials, and police (while in the neighboring country). Under this project two Kyrgyz communities, Kyrgyz-Kyshtak and Kaytpas, which are both served by the same Water Users Association (WUA), for irrigation water, have been mobilized to work together to strengthen their currently non-functioning WUA, and are negotiating water allocations and usage fees for the two villages. Additionally, this project has opened discussions with Uzbekistan government officials concerning the issuance of an immigration stamp to the border post between Kyrgyz-Kyshtak and Borbalyk Village. The two villages are located 50 meters apart, however, due to the fact that there is no immigration stamp at the border post between the two villages, residents have to travel through the border post located at Rishton, which results in a 16-kilometer trip. The Head of the Border Services for Ferghana Valley Region of Uzbekistan has promised to work to resolve this issue. Lastly, a baseline assessment was conducted at the start of the project, and the results of this assessment will be compared with the results of an assessment that will be held at the end of the project to measure the change in the level of the participants' knowledge regarding the law in these spheres and attitudinal changes regarding self-empowerment.

### *Kayragach Navruz*

Multi-community, trans-border *Navruz* celebrations (Spring New Year's) have become a staple of PCI over the past three years, as few other culture events are as anticipated or more widely celebrated in the rural areas of all three countries in the Ferghana Valley. A day to mark the end of winter and the beginning of the growing season, *Navruz* celebrations are ideal occasions to bring different ethnicities together to celebrate shared cultural traditions. For three years, PCI has used this opportunity to bring residents from neighboring villages together, to focus on similarities and connectors, as opposed to differences and dividers.



*Two counterpart Deputy Hokims, from Leilak Raion, Kyrgyzstan (left) and Bobojon-Gafurov Raion, Tajikistan (right), take time to relax and converse at the trans-border Navruz festival in Kayragach*

This year also brought large *Navruz* celebrations to all of the PCI clusters, but what was different this year was the degree to which PCI participated in the organization. Though most of our social projects have large community contributions, this year's *Navruz* celebration in Kayragach, Kyrgyzstan set a new precedent. When the PCI field team inquired with their CIG counterparts about upcoming plans for the holiday, the CIG members simply replied that a plan was already in the works. Much to the delight of the field officers, they were invited to attend as guests only, and were told that their assistance was not necessary in the preparations.

Six CIGs from six villages jointly planned the event; Ovchi (Uzbek), Kalacha (Tajik) and Pakhtaabad (Kyrgyz) from Tajikistan, and International (Kyrgyz), Kayragach (Uzbek) and Kulunda (Kyrgyz) from Kyrgyzstan. The preparation began by organizing *Navruz* delegations comprised of 15 individuals from each attending community. These delegations were responsible for organizing large displays of traditional foods, dance routines, and musical performances for the festival. Additionally, CIG members from both countries divided up the responsibility of inviting various local government officials and arranging transportation for residents.

On the day of the *Navruz* celebration, more than 800 residents from all six villages came together to jointly celebrate the holiday. A panel of judges from each of the CIGs judged the various competitions, and made sure that each village was the winner in some category. The weather was spectacular, and residents came from all over to enjoy themselves, perching on overlooking roofs or crowding around the school's courtyard, where *tapchans* and hanging rugs



cordoned off the festival grounds. With government representatives from both sides of the border sitting side by side and visibly enjoying themselves, it was a day to remember. And what made it extra special in the minds of PCI team members was that it was all done independent of USAID resource, meaning that there is a very good chance that this precedent could be here to stay.

## **V. Increase Abilities of Communities to Identify Sources of Conflict**

### *Karabog-Chorbog-Dostuk Canal*

During this reporting period, one of the more ambitious PCI infrastructure projects was undertaken to address an acute source of trans-border tension over water resources between three PCI villages.

As with many trans-border clusters of villages, the interdependency of Karabog and Chorbog, Tajikistan, and Dostuk, Kyrgyzstan is complicated. These small villages are home to no more than 800 individuals combined, though their longstanding and highly publicized tensions over irrigation water shortages have drawn significant attention from regional governments and international organizations. The heart of the matter is that one irrigation canal brings water through two Tajik villages in Tajikistan, and then finally to a Kyrgyz village in Kyrgyzstan. For the past few years, very little water has reached Dostuk, Kyrgyzstan (which is separated from the rest of Batken oblast by a practically impassable set of hills, and accessible only via roads in Tajikistan). What makes the situation more interesting is that land privatization in Kyrgyzstan has given residents in Dostuk parcels of land, which run parallel to the two neighboring villages in Tajikistan (Karabog and Chorbog). These parcels of land are in turn *rented out* to Tajikistan residents from Karabog and Chorbog, who farm the land and irrigate the fields from the same canal *which in turn runs dry* by the time it reaches Dostuk. Throw into the mix an upstream state farm in Tajikistan, who recently decided to grow rice, despite the fact that the water required for rice violates the water allocation agreement between all parties concerned, and there were no shortages of fingers being pointed.

When these villages were selected as PCI communities during the Isfara expansion, it was understood that we would be addressing the irrigation canal first and foremost. The SDC-funded Regional Dialogue and Development project (RDD) had been working in these villages for over a year prior to PCI's arrival, but their lack of funds prohibited them from repairing the canal. When selecting sites, both projects agreed to coordinate in this cluster, to leverage RDD's experience with PCI's available resources. The plan worked.

By forming our CIGs around village residents that RDD had trained in mediation, PCI inherited villages with previous experience in consensus building and conflict resolution. When given the opportunity to concretely address the irrigation issue, these individuals responded well. Although the two Tajik communities were initially more interested in implementing other projects that directly addressed their needs (such as transformers, and drinking water systems), PCI made it clear that until the joint canal was complete, there would be no other projects. Emphasizing the need to assist neighbors and collectively solve problems, while underscoring the point with a flurry of joint social and cultural projects, it was not long before an agreement was reached between leaders of all three villages and the local water authority. Not only was a plan to repair the canal and improve the system's efficiency in place, but an agreement on how to regulate water usage, and arbitrate potential disagreements was reached as well.





*Abduvali Rabiev (right), leader of the Dostuk CIG, monitors canal construction.*

As with most projects, coming to agreement was the hardest part. Once community and government leaders had solidified usage and management plans, the physical reconstruction of the canal was much easier. With high community contribution, and never a shortage of onlookers and amateur project foreman, once the project found traction, the work was completed in short time and with high quality. This project serves as yet another example of how local conflict situations can be resolved successfully with limited outside assistance supporting and encouraging local initiative.

#### *Karabog-Charbog-Dostuk Case Study*

To assist USAID in better understanding of the complexity and the different layers of potential for conflict in the PCI clustered border communities, a case study of the three abovementioned communities (Karabog-Charbog-Dostuk) on the Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan border can be found in Appendix A. The case study was written to highlight the complexities of working in border regions: the problems of apparent random borders, practical enclaves, different economic reform in respective countries, and mismanagement of natural resources.<sup>3</sup> The case study was written to highlight of the tensions that exist, as opposed to focusing on one particular PCI intervention.

## **VI. Coordination**

Over the period this report covers, PCI coordinated activities with numerous USAID Implementers and other international organizations. Two good examples of close coordination with USAID implementing partners were with Abt's Sports and Health Education Program (SHEP) and Academy for Educational Development's (AED) Training program.

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<sup>3</sup> A *practical enclave* is "not geographically detached from their motherland, are more easily reached by entering a foreign country, because of their location in a hilly area, or because the only road available enters that foreign place before coming back to the mother country." Definition from <http://www.wordiq.com>.

### *SHEP coordination*

During the period of this report, field officers from four PCI teams and SHEP coordinates had three meetings in Khojand to coordinate activities in 24 PCI communities. The result of the meetings was to integrate SHEP youth camps and game days with PCI activities. Each of the PCI teams in coordination with SHEP has developed annual plans for a sustainable youth sports program. The sports leagues will be provided with Nike equipment and minor funds to repair sport fields and halls. A sports coordination group will be developed in each PCI cluster.

### *AED Water Trainings*

In March, AED provided two trainings in Ferghana designed to improve the capacity of water committees (WC) that operate and maintain potable water systems built under the PCI and CAIP programs. Over 40 participants from PCI and CAIP Uzbekistan communities in the Ferghana Valley attended the trainings. The primary goal of the program was to increase the capacity of WCs in terms of planning and implementation, as well as strengthening their organizational and management structures. The sessions were conducted using participatory methodology to match the realities of the situation in their communities. The training participants received handouts on the legal framework and organizational structure for WCs in Uzbekistan. This training program complimented the activities of PCI Teams and Community Initiative Groups to assure the sustainability of the potable water systems.

Other Coordination in the period included:

- DFID is funding a 6-month project “Women as Leaders in Water Resource Management” in four PCI communities in Uzbekistan. The project is focused on women’s role in the sustainability of potable water systems.
- Three containers of Nike Equipment, valued at \$1.5 million arrived and passed through custom’s procedures. The equipment is being used for PCI and CAIP sport programs through out the Ferghana Valley.
- The World Bank delivered medical equipment for the health clinic in Korayantak, Ferghana Oblast.
- PCI Project Director, as member of Eurasia Foundation Ferghana Valley Steering/Grant Committee, reviewed and approved grants for FV based NGOs.
- Two PCI Field Officers attend training provided by INTRAC “Community Development in Rural Areas of Central Asia” in Osh, Kyrgyzstan.
- International Secretariat for Water (Canadian based NGO) funded by SDC will construct a potable water system in PCI Community Kalaynav, Uzbekistan.
- Fido, a PCI Partner NGO, applied and received the placement of a US Peace Corps Volunteer based in their Andijan office.

## **VII. Political Environment**

### *Impact on PCI as a Result of March Violence in Tashkent*

As a result of the bombings in Tashkent in late March, which resulted in over 40 deaths, the Uzbekistan borders to Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan were tightened. The first reports blamed the attacks on international terrorist; however, theories developed that the most probable perpetrators were terrorist groups within Uzbekistan. Though this affected PCI field officers travel in the Ferghana Valley, about a week after the bombings, PCI Field Officers reported that they had no problems crossing the borders, though it took more time. In addition, many PCI infrastructure projects were slowed down, especially in Sokh enclave, because of the difficulty of getting building materials to the sites. In addition, though the borders were closed officially for several

days after the bombings, there was obvious illegal crossing for a fee. During this period there were numerous rumors that spread because of the lack of press information about the events. Most of the rumors exaggerated the death toll and other false information of additional bombings, including a widespread rumor that there was a bomb attack in Andijan.

During this period saw the transfer of oversight of international and local NGO's from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to the Ministry of Justice in Uzbekistan, which resulted in the closure of Soros Foundation, and saw tightening of control of national NGOs. The Uzbekistan Government has started tracking grants through MC partner NGOs and has resulted in the freezing of some accounts. The NGOs have been told that they can only have accounts with Asaka and National Banks.

### **VIII. Tribute to Rauvshan Adzhibaev**

In addition to the many successes during this reporting period, out of tribute, we would like to remember one of the elite of in the PCI process, whose untimely death marks the passing of a great man, who embodied the spirit of leadership and community. Rauvshan Adzhibaev was the leader of the CIG in Kim, Tajikistan, and despite his young age, had emerged as a strong leader in his community of ethnic Kyrgyz in Isfara region. His constant enthusiasm and encouragement had been key to the implementation of many PCI activities in Isfara region. One of his greatest contributions had been the instrumental role that Rauvshan took in helping neighbors and residents successfully implement a natural gas pipeline project in Kim, providing much needed heating to the village school and kindergarten. With the project in its final stages, Rauvshan had just left the Isfara Gas Department building, where he had been consulting with government officials on the PCI infrastructure project, when he was hit and killed by a speeding car while walking across the road. Rauvshan leaves behind a wife, as well as two small children, both of whom attend the kindergarten that he was working so hard to provide heating for. Rauvshan will be both missed and remembered.”

## **IX. Contact Information**

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## Appendix A Karabog-Charbog-Dostuk Case Study<sup>4</sup>

### *Border Qishloq—village cluster*

The Isfarinka River flows through an idyllic valley settled among towering mountains, rice fields and orchards of apricot trees. Running through the southern edge of Central Asia's Ferghana Valley, the river is clear and crawls slowly through the valley in the dry winter months, but spring and early summer bring both the rains and the mountain snowmelt, and the pacific, shallow stream is transformed into a rushing river. Providing both drinking and irrigation water, the river is the primary source of life for the villages which line its banks for tens of kilometers along the northeast border of the Republic of Tajikistan and the southwest border of the Republic of Kyrgyzstan. A cluster of three small villages—Karabog-Chorbog-Dostuk (in order of their proximity to the water source) sidling along the Kyrgyzstan-Tajikistan border—is one such community entirely dependent upon the Isfarinka for drinking, their livestock, crop irrigation and their livelihoods. Karabog and Chorbog are located on the Tajikistan side of the border, and Dostuk is a village across the border in Kyrgyzstan. Although to casual viewers, there is no way of knowing this: on the side of the highway that runs along the river, a dilapidated concrete soviet bus stop serves as the demarcation point between the two independent republics.

Though a river would seem the most obvious and natural boundary between any two states, the Isfarinka has been granted no such responsibility. Instead, it runs through Tajikistan, closely parallel to, but never acting as, the border with Kyrgyzstan. When the newly created Central Asian republics were absorbed into the Soviet Union, the Soviet planners created borders with scarcely any regard for obvious natural boundaries, let alone the ethnic or linguistic composition of the population. This is in part due to the difficulty in identifying clearly defined ethnic-based states among the multi-ethnic population of the then-Turkestan Soviet Socialist Republic, a vast area with no legacy of officially recognize frontiers, and many nomadic peoples<sup>5</sup>. But, Moscow also perceived the need to concoct republics' borders that would divide, rather than unify, peoples with linguistic and ethnic commonalties to deter separatist movements. Following the protracted and bloody subjugation of the Basmachi and other Central Asian rebellions against the Red Army occupation<sup>6</sup> in the 1920s, Stalin devised his 'divide and conquer' campaign of drawing up borders among the newly absorbed republics to stave off further resistance and anti-Russian sentiment in the region. This relatively benign legacy of Stalin's has left Central Asia, and especially the Ferghana Valley, with incomprehensible and arbitrary jigsaw puzzle borders, and a host of territorial and ethnic problems associated with such frontiers. One of the most problematic issues stemming from these borders is the geographic oddity of enclaves ('islands' of one republic's land surrounded completely by the territory of another). Seven such enclaves with large population centers dot the landscape of the Ferghana Valley, as well as numerous smaller, unpopulated enclaves or with populations of less than a few hundred people. Also, the zig-


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<sup>4</sup> The "Karabog-Charbog-Dostuk Case Study" was written by Kevin Grubb in March 2004. Mr. Grubb is a journalist/intern currently working with PCI and CAIP in the Ferghana Valley.

<sup>5</sup> International Crisis Group (ICG) Report, "Central Asia: Border Disputes and Conflict Potential", April 4, 2002.

<sup>6</sup> The Basmachi Rebellion was the name the Soviets gave to the Pan-Turkestan resistance against occupation by the Red Army beginning before the Revolution of February, 1917. The Basmachis fought fiercely to remain independent, and rallied against the Soviet Union's 'denomadization and collectivization' programs. Although grouped as one fighting force by the Soviet Army under the umbrella name of Basmachis, the rebellion was actually several different guerilla bands, unable to come together and coordinate efforts, and eventually put down in 1924. Some sporadic resistance continued until 1931, but futile as the new Central Asian republics had long been absorbed into the composition of the Soviet Union. Although downplayed by many during Soviet times as a few radicals with little popular support, today's estimates put the Basmachi casualties at as high as 200,000. onwar.com, December, 2000. Today, prominent hills along the Isfarinka River still display the ruins of Basmachi communication towers, from where they informed each other of the whereabouts of the Red Army forces by torchlight.

zagging boundaries have created thousands of strips of one state's land which finger deeply into a neighboring republic's sovereignty. Such borders have left inhabitants divided from their families and homelands, and caused microcosmic tensions and macrocosmic disputes over land.



Once a united village known simply as Karabog (Black Fields), the demise of the Soviet Union brought nationalism, official observance of the suddenly, and arbitrarily conceived, international borders to the cluster, and ethnic tensions and conflicts as a result. Where once frontiers were no more than lines on a map and all people were 'Soviet', now border posts and their accompanying

guards appeared, and a new sense of nationalistic pride began to flourish among ethnic groups. In the Karabog *troika*, the Kyrgyz renamed the community on their side of the border Dostuk (Friendship), but the change was just that, nominal. Located on one such aforementioned strip of land deep into Tajikistan territory, the village is a distant outpost in their own country, and has remained dependent upon Tajikistan for government services. The Tajikistan government, meanwhile, offered free plots of land to their nationals to settle in Karabog, and on the nearly unpopulated tiny pocket of territory between Karabog in Tajikistan and the renamed Dostuk. This is the village of Chorbog (Four Fields). Furthermore, the end of Soviet rule brought the end of state-guaranteed jobs, and the ensuing unfathomably high level of unemployment (80% in many parts of the Ferghana Valley<sup>7</sup>) forced many villagers to take up agriculture for their livelihoods, putting even greater stress on the already limited resources in the area. Although agriculture is in itself a form of employment, a majority of farmers are engaged only in subsistence farming, and consider themselves unemployed. Even those villagers lucky enough to have full-time employment on the *Kolkhoz* earn a wage of only twenty to thirty somoni a month (about 6 to 9 USD).

Karabog-Chorbog-Dostuk's remote location in the northern Sogd Raion of Tajikistan has left it long neglected by its respective governments, both under the Soviet Union and today. Tajik villagers in Sogd sense this remoteness to the extent that they refer to the civil war that ravaged their country for almost six years (1992-1997) as the "War in Dushanbe." This isolation has meant state services are at a minimum. There are separate schools on either side of the border, one where lessons are taught in Kyrgyz, the other in Tajik. There is also electricity, although it is limited to four hours a day, from six to eight in the morning and seven to nine in the evening. There is no medical clinic, no natural gas, no sanitation services, no paved roads and, of course, no running water.

There is, however, an old Soviet gravity-powered irrigation system fed by the Isfarinka River that for years provided the cluster of villages with both their drinking and irrigation water. Water usage was regulated by Ministry of Land Reclamation and Water Management in Moscow, and no one strayed a millimeter from their prescribed allotment for fear of repercussions from the state. In the twelve years since independence, however, the irrigation system has fallen into disrepair, and state water management, under-funded and under-staffed, has all but disappeared. The concrete trenches are half-filled with silt and clay, and the slope of the trenches has dropped significantly as they have sunk into the earth, so that water is simply not flowing at the same speed or volume. Also, some private farmers and *kolkhozniki*<sup>8</sup> have tapped into the system illegally, siphoning off the precious water for their personal use, or leaving holes in the trenches through which water is lost when their makeshift irrigation pipes have been discovered and removed by authorities. About half of all irrigation water in Central Asia is lost to evaporation and filtration; in Tajikistan alone, the loss is estimated at seventy percent.<sup>9</sup> All experts agree that there is enough water for everyone, but such misuse, mismanagement and the crumbling infrastructure have all coalesced to ensure water shortages and conflicts over the priceless resource. Weather has contributed yet further to the ongoing water shortages in the area. The Ferghana Valley, and especially Tajikistan, has suffered through severe droughts in the last consecutive four years. Suddenly, there is not nearly enough water to go around, especially to the last village in line in the irrigation system's distribution, Dostuk, Kyrgyzstan, and their crops have suffered the most as a result.

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<sup>7</sup> ICG Report, "Central Asia: Drugs and Conflict", November 26, 2001.

<sup>8</sup> *Kolkhozniki*: an abbreviated term for farmers on Soviet state-owned Collective Farms or *Kolkhozi* (*Kollektivnoye Khozyaistvo*), a concept that has remained in name and in practice in independent Tajikistan, but since disappeared in Kyrgyzstan.

<sup>9</sup> ICG Report, "Central Asia: Water and Conflict", May 30, 2002.



Apricots, especially in their dried form, are the main crop and primary source of income for villagers in the Isfarinka valley. The bazaar in Sogd boasts an endless sea of dried apricots in varying degrees of orange, and at three dollars a kilogram, they fetch one of the highest prices of any crop in the Ferghana Valley. But, several factors in the last thirteen years have led to lower yields and lower incomes for the villagers. Besides arid weather and the failing irrigation system, many orchards went neglected and dried up in the chaos that followed the break-up of the Soviet Union and the ensuing civil war in Tajikistan, and villagers took advantage of the near anarchy by cutting down thousands of trees to use as firewood in their homes. Now, in an effort to salvage their trees and their livelihoods, women and children in many villages, including Dostuk, carry buckets of water to irrigate their apricot trees in the hills overlooking the Isfarinka. They haul two buckets at a time uphill, eight to ten kilograms per bucket, balanced on a stick slung over their shoulders. Still, trees are drying up and harvests are shrinking, and for this, ethnicities on either side of the border blame one another, and disputes over water usage and land rights have come to the forefront of village life.

In an effort to help ease some of these resource-based tensions in Karabog-Chorbog-Dostuk, the USAID-funded Peaceful Communities Initiative (PCI) program assisted residents from all three villages to jointly implement a reconstruction project of the 4-kilometer Soviet irrigation system. From January to March, 2004, community members and the local water department worked on the canal rehabilitation project, made possible only after citizens collectively designed and agreed upon a fair and sustainable management plan, with support from both governments, as well as the local *kolkhoz*. The \$8,000 USD rehabilitation project included increasing the slope of the sinking trenches, lining them to prevent against further filtration, filling illegal holes and cleaning them of the accumulated mud, debris and clay. A multi-ethnic Community Initiative Group (CIG) comprised of leaders from all three communities was established at the onset to monitor work on the project, and, with the project's completion, to ensure that their members are adhering to the pre-established water quotas for their communities. For now, all communities are satisfied with the project, as water pressure and volume in the canals have remained efficient and sufficient, even for the farmers and their apricot trees in Dostuk. But all are aware that the current state of relative calm is tenuous and depends on much more than water flow. Proper management and maintenance of the irrigation system, as well as open communication are key to helping villagers put aside their differences and beginning to forget the history of bad blood among the villages and between the ethnicities.

## **Karabog**

Karabog is referred to as the 'head' of the village cluster, as it is located furthest upstream on the Isfarinka, and therefore, enjoys first privileges to the irrigation system's water. But the residents resent this title as 'head', and rightfully so. Ahead of Karabog in pecking order is a microscopic enclave of land that is officially Kyrgyzstan territory.

"They plant rice in these fields, and rice needs a lot of water<sup>5</sup>," community leader and CIG member, Rosikboi Isoev, says. "This year, the *jamoat*<sup>10</sup> is forbidding them to plant rice, so we think the situation will improve." The vague pronouns, 'they' and 'them' that Rosikboi employs seem to imply that he is referring to some 'other' landowners, namely the Kyrgyz. However, the situation is much more complicated than that. In fact, the farmers on the enclave are his fellow

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<sup>6</sup> Rice, in fact, requires more than twice as much irrigation water as Central Asia's primary crop, cotton, and six times as much water as wheat. Rice requires an average of 30,000 cubic meters of water per hectare; cotton, 12,000 meters per hectare; and wheat, 5,000. International Crisis Group report, "Central Asia: Water and Conflict", May 30, 2002.

<sup>7</sup> Tajikistan district-level government.

Tajiks who rent the land from the Kyrgyz owners, and who have chosen to plant rice on the flat, fertile beds along the river. The Tajik rice farmers redirect irrigation water to the crops they grow on land rented from Kyrgyz landowners, which, in turn, leads to water shortages downstream in Dostuk for these very Kyrgyz landowners.

Four years ago, after fruitless appeals to the Isfara *jamoat* for intervention and a just water management program, and sensing no other resolution to the water shortages, the Kyrgyz farmers in Dostuk launched the first of a series of late night water raids into Karabog. Usually, between the hours of midnight and three, teams of Kyrgyz farmers would enter Karabog, closing off pipes and canals to Tajik homes and fields, and redirecting the water in the trenches to Kyrgyzstan land in Dostuk. “They would just come into our village and steal the water,” Rosikboi says. The Kyrgyz felt they were only taking what they were entitled to. Regardless of principle, the outcome of these raids was, unsurprisingly, unpleasant, and only further exacerbated the water-based conflicts. Karabog residents established night guards to protect against the raids, and, during an ensuing incursion by the Kyrgyz, violence broke out between the two sides. ‘Several fights’ followed, and the bitterness and tensions between the two communities led to a series of retaliatory reactions on behalf of the Kyrgyz, leading to even more resentment and deliberate water mismanagement on the side of the Tajiks (described in further detail below).

Karabog residents feel their economic situation has left them with no other option than to use the water they need for their survival and the survival of their crops. The disastrously high level of unemployment, extreme poverty and the rise in population in the village that precipitated the resource-based conflicts have put further strain on water resources as more and more Karabog residents take up agriculture for their subsistence. Rosikboi says about 10 people of his village’s 204 residents have full-time employment (5%)—two teachers and about 8 workers on the *Kolkhoz*. “Until 1990, there was no unemployment,” he says. “Water usage and land was not an issue at all. Then, the USSR falls apart, and there’s nowhere to work, and everyone turned to agriculture. Then, the water problems began...the only real work in the village is picking apricots during harvest time.”

As a result, at any given time, approximately twenty percent of the male residents in the village cluster are away in Russia labouring as migrant workers to make money to support their families, doing work and receiving wages they could otherwise not find in Tajikistan<sup>8</sup>. Even the most unskilled laborers can earn 200 USD per month, over ten times a professional’s salary in Tajikistan.<sup>11</sup> Often taking the most dangerous and meanest jobs the Russians themselves will not do, Tajik men spend usually anywhere from three to eight months in Russia, leaving their families alone in the meantime. Some migrant workers do not return at all, marrying a second wife in Russia, and periodically sending home money to their Tajik families. The dangerous work, and often even more dangerous Russian employers, also result in a high mortality rate among migrant workers. Karabog, Chorbog and a third village across the Isfarinka had six of their men sent home from Russia last year in wooden coffins. These scenarios create further tensions in the communities as women, already stretched too thin by their child-rearing and household duties and work in the fields, are forced into the role as head-of-household, a role they are unfamiliar and uncomfortable with, raised in the traditionally male-dominated societies of Central Asia. Children of such temporary and permanent single-parent households are often left

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<sup>8</sup> Estimates put the number of Tajik migrant labourers in Russia at any given time at between 600,000 and 1.5 million of a total country population of 6.5 million. Each year, the money and gifts sent home by such workers is equal to the entire budget of the Republic, 200 to 230 million USD. The actual figures are assumed to be much higher as such transfers are difficult to track. One estimate puts the number at closer to 600 million USD. Fifty percent of Tajiks are dependent upon such monies for their survival. United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs.

<sup>9</sup> ICG Report, Tajikistan: A Roadmap for Development”; April 24, 2003.

unattended.<sup>12</sup> Rosikboi himself is not a migrant laborer, but exports dried apricots to Russia, and is absent from his family for several months of the year driving truckloads of apricots from Isfara to Russia, sometimes as far as Moscow. He admits to making a comfortable living at his work, at least enjoying far better income than his previous employment as a teacher in the local school, where he received a salary of 20 somoni a month, mostly paid in arrears.

The radical rise in population in the villages has also contributed to increased tensions in the community. In 1983, Rosikboi explains, there were approximately only 20 families living in the village of Karabog. Today, there are 64 families, with plots for another 140 appropriated by the state in 1991, creating fertile ground for a population ‘explosion’ in the cluster, and the worrisome potential for even more disastrous land and water shortages.

This is only the beginning of the many complicated and multifaceted issues, tensions and ethnic nuances that have plagued this tiny cluster of villages for the last thirteen years. Water, the primary conflict contributor in itself, has become the unwitting catalyst for a series of other conflicts born from tactics that each side employs to posture against the other, and the hostilities have continued to grow and fester, until the match found the proverbial powder keg and violence erupted.

## **Chorbog**

Nasimboi Sobirov lives in tiny Chorbog (population: 60), in a one-room house with his wife and two children. Also on his land are a storage hut, a chicken coop, an outhouse and an outdoor kitchen where his wife prepares the family’s modest meals over a small closed fire pit. The house is built in the traditional manner, with a combination of rice hay, mud and clay (no dung, as Nasim has no livestock). There is a small Dutch oven in their living quarters, which keeps the family warm during the difficult mountain winters. Nasim, a member of the CIG, works at the village school across the river chopping wood for heating the classrooms and receives a salary of 7 somoni a month (about \$2.30). His training as a *santechnik* (‘sanitation technician’, or plumber) allows him to take odd jobs here and there when they are offered, working on private irrigation pumps. With this work, he is able to complement his income some months out of the year, but by no means all. And he and his wife live in staggering poverty, most definitely a part of the 83% of Tajik households living below the poverty line, if not the 15% living in total destitution<sup>4</sup>. He planned on joining fellow villagers to work in Russia this year, but now says his involvement with the water project will not afford him to be absent for such an extended period.

Nasim does spend a great deal of time working on the project, having visited the rehabilitation site regularly during reconstruction, and conferring with other CIG members as new issues arise. This, despite the fact that his community has faced no water shortages or direct conflicts as a result thereof. The smallest of the three villages, it has less territory and requires much less water than its neighbors, according to Nasimboi. He says they have agreed to take part in the project for the good of the whole, and in hopes of beginning work on a transformer as the next joint project with PCI. Since Chorbog has been mostly populated only in the recent years following independence, the community has been provided with no government services, including the four hours of electricity that their neighbours enjoy. So, like many communities in Central Asia, they simply connected themselves to the electric lines running mockingly past their village. Now, poorly constructed electric poles lean dangerously to the side, and wires rigged by amateurs dangle precariously within arms’ reach. They are counting on successful completion of the water

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<sup>10</sup> United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs.

<sup>11</sup> United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs.

project as the stepping-stone to installation of a transformer and professionally constructed electric poles, meeting safety standards.

For their part, the Chorbog residents feel they are not as directly involved in the conflicts due to their lower demand for water, but have become collateral casualties in the ongoing water wars as a result of their location crammed in between the two larger villages. And they say they have become the unjustified recipients of the Kyrgyz retaliation directed at Karabog, due to their immediate proximity to Dostuk.

Ostensibly, since man has occupied the land in the Isfarinka River valley, his livestock has roamed freely and grazed on the empty fields in the winter and high up into the mountains during planting season, regardless of borders. But, in reaction to the alleged water abuse by the Tajiks, the Kyrgyz enforced land and grazing rights in their territory. When cattle or sheep owned by Chorbog shepherds strayed onto Dostuk land, the Kyrgyz would capture them and hold them at the cooperative farm until the Tajik owner appeared to reclaim his livestock. When the Tajik shepherd would come to retrieve his property, the Kyrgyz exacted a fine from him for his use of their land, and would not allow the livestock to go until a ransom of ten to fifteen dollars was paid, most often an amount the peasant could not afford. Nasim and his fellow villagers attempted to engage in their own ‘cattle rustling’ tactics, capturing six cows and holding them for a hundred-dollar bounty, but the Chorbog *Kolkhoz* brigadier refused to abet their actions, and the cattle were returned to the Kyrgyz owners.

Nasimboi says they tried to maintain good relations with their Kyrgyz neighbours, and only took the livestock in response to the Kyrgyz cattle stealing. He and other fellow villagers think the actions on behalf of the Kyrgyz are especially insulting as the standard of living in Kyrgyzstan is much higher than that of the Tajiks. They describe their Kyrgyz neighbours as ‘well off’ and even ‘rich’. “Look at the way they build their houses,” he says. “Many of them are involved in criminal trading activities.”

In fact, a walk through Dostuk reveals no visible difference in wealth or lifestyle from their Tajik counterparts across the border. However, the Kyrgyz admit they do earn slightly more money and live slightly more comfortably as a result of the Republic’s successful land reform programs, privatizing much of the country’s arable land, in contrast to the continuing state control of land and agriculture in Tajikistan.

“We have our own land which was given to us by the government, so we may live better in that regard,” one Dostuk resident says, then echoing his Tajik counterpart: “But other than that, we live worse. You’ve seen how they build their houses.”

(Whether or not Nasim’s remark of ‘criminal trading activities’ is a reference to the opium smuggling rampant in both countries is left to speculation. Although, recently, the internationally condemned drug-running from Afghanistan through Central Asia into Russia and Europe<sup>13</sup> was brought home, as one smuggler was discovered in the unassuming community of Dostuk, a young female teacher at the elementary school. She has not been arrested and retains her job. Dostuk residents say they are not involved in any such activities, but economic need requires some villagers to work as drivers for metal-smugglers from Osh, Kyrgyzstan.)

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<sup>12</sup> Three of the major routes of trafficking of drugs from Afghanistan through Central Asia and on to Russia and Europe are found in Tajikistan. One of these routes continues northward to Osh, Kyrgyzstan. Thirty to fifty percent of all economic activity in Tajikistan is related to this trade. Women comprise 35 percent of all drug-related convictions in Tajikistan, 12.4 percent in Kyrgyzstan. ICG Report, “Central Asia: Drugs and Conflict”, November 26, 2001.

As evidenced by Nasim's and others' words, this stark difference in the two states' land policies has created an intangible conflict contributor among the villagers: envy. The Tajiks simply feel cheated by their own government, and resent the Kyrgyz their land ownership and comparative self-determination.

"In the future, we hope there will be private land, like in Kyrgyzstan," Rosikboi says. "But that is in the future for now."

## **Dostuk**

Dostuk, Kyrgyzstan, with a population of 450, is by far the largest of the three formerly united villages. Abduvali Rabiev is one of the 'rich' Kyrgyz in Dostuk that Nasim often refers to when speaking of his neighbors across the border. Rabiev is the brigadier of a cooperative farm in Dostuk, a position that affords him a decent salary and some privileges along the way. His opulent lifestyle includes a large two-room house, four cows, seven sheep, several chickens and a pre-perestroika era four-door *Zhiguli*. He is a very soft-spoken member of the CIG, but becomes much more animated when referring to the water issues that plague the border villagers. He vehemently defends the Kyrgyz water raids, saying:

We're at the tail end of all the water users. The trenches are too thin. [The Tajiks] even divert water to their own homes, not just the fields. Sometimes, we had to direct the water to our villages at night to get any water—only at night, from twelve to three—while they all slept. Otherwise, we have no water. Yes, physical fights broke out as a result. But they take all the water they want. After them, we get what little water is left, and our trees have dried up. This problem has gone on for four years now.

Abduvali says he has made attempts to go through the proper authorities to help solve their water problems before they began the raids. He appealed to the Isfara *jamoat* for assistance, but the Tajik governor was unsympathetic to the Kyrgyz needs.

"We held a big meeting with the *jamoat* and all he said was, 'The water you had *was* enough, it *is* enough, and it *will be* enough. What, did your land expand or something?'"

For a Kyrgyzstan village almost entirely dependent on a foreign state for their basic services, water is only the beginning of their problems.

"We have problems at every step we take," Abduvali says. He regularly refers to Dostuk as an enclave. It is more a virtual enclave, surrounded on three sides by Tajikistan, and a 10-kilometer stretch of barren mountains on the fourth, connecting—or more properly, dividing—it from the rest of Kyrgyzstan. Until recently there was not even a dirt road through these mountains, and the Kyrgyz were forced to travel through Tajikistan and its border post in order to get to their own oblast capitol of Batken, 30 kilometers away. The border posts are an annoyance for anyone traveling internationally, but the guards would be sure to more thoroughly harass a Kyrgyz driver than their Tajik compatriots. And Dostuk residents wishing to trade at a Kyrgyz bazaar must pay exorbitant duties on their goods when passing through Tajikistan customs. At the nearest bazaar in Sogd, Tajikistan, Kyrgyz say they are discriminated against and offered lower prices for their goods.

“They check your car through and through, over and over, and then they check into your pockets,” Abduvali says, referring to the tariffs and bribes that Kyrgyz travelers must pay, two to three times greater than Tajiks.

Abduvali used his influence as brigadier of the collective farm and the farm’s equipment to have a dirt ‘road’ cleared through the mountains for Kyrgyz travelers to Batken. The road is still impassable during wet weather, but it has alleviated some of their travel problems. But, basic services such as education, medicine, and government representation that is sympathetic—or at very least, shares a common language—to their needs are still an hour’s drive away.

There is a small school in Dostuk, half of which was built with USAID support, which serves children up to the ninth grade. Those that want to further their education must travel to Batken, but scarcely any Dostuk families can afford such a luxury. To receive medical treatment, the Kyrgyz must either travel the hour stretch to Batken or appeal to Tajik doctors in Isfara. The doctors will not always render medical assistance to foreign nationals, and they require that the Kyrgyz sign a waiver removing liability for any problems that may occur while a patient is in their care. And for any care received, Kyrgyz patients must again pay bribes to the doctors two to three times greater than the Tajiks. Hospitals and clinics also refuse to assist with childbirth, citing Tajikistan’s naturalization laws of citizenship at birth<sup>5</sup>, so women in labour are forced to travel the long and bumpy road to Batken to deliver their babies.

The Republic of Kyrgyzstan devised their reaction to all of this in typical Central Asian government calamitous fashion. In 2001, the state decided to ‘come to the rescue’ of their citizens in the hinterlands of the state. The government built a border post on the Isfara highway, where the road passes through the small finger of Kyrgyzstan territory at Dostuk, which, far from alleviating conflict, only further upset the hornets’ nest of tension between the two ethnic groups in the border villages. Although the government’s official justification for the border posts was to prevent further IMU incursions into Kyrgyzstan from Tajikistan<sup>14</sup>, Tajik residents doubted the verity of this claim, certain that it was simply another in a long line of maneuvers to inconvenience them in the ongoing conflicts between the two nationalities. Their doubt is supported by the otherwise complete porousness of the border along the Isfarinka.

The border guards played their roles as agitators brilliantly, molesting every Tajik traveler passing through their post. They stopped every private car, taxi or truck driver that needed passage, regardless of how many times the vehicle crossed their path in a day. For some taxi drivers and truckers transporting goods, that was more than ten times a day. The soldiers manning the posts followed standard operating procedure for border guards throughout Central Asia, questioning the drivers on their destination, searching cars and requiring tariffs for transported goods to and from the bazaar, and, of course, exacting bribes for any and all trans-border violations they could concoct. The border post quickly replaced water as the primary conflict contributor in the area, and was wreaking havoc on the miniscule local economies of the Tajik villagers. After a couple of months, the Tajiks had had enough, and planned their rebellion.

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<sup>13</sup> Tajikistan Law automatically grants citizenship to anyone born in Tajikistan. A non-Tajik citizen has until 16 years of age to apply for a change of citizenship.

<sup>14</sup> IMU (Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan), now the Islamic Party of Turkestan, is a militant Islamic political group calling for the establishment of a pan-Turkestan Caliphate. The group is widely believed to be responsible for several attacks on security forces in Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan in 1999-2000, as well as the February, 1999 bombings in Tashkent, and the kidnapping of four Japanese geologists and several US mountain climbers in Kyrgyzstan. After initially taking refuge in Tajikistan, the group established roots in Afghanistan and is widely considered to have been mostly wiped out during the US-led invasion in October, 2001. Charles Carson, March 8, 2003; Alisher Khomidov, March 14, 2003. Eurasianet.org.

They organized drivers from all along the Isfara highway to create a blockade at the southern end of the border post. Cars, trucks and tractors lined the highway on both sides for several kilometers, blocking Kyrgyz drivers from entering Tajikistan to trade at the bazaar in Sogd, and from entering Kyrgyzstan to return home. The Tajiks demanded that travel restrictions first be ceased, or that the border post be closed altogether. The border guards ordered them to end their blockade immediately, or they would be left with no choice but to retaliate with force. The standoff continued throughout the day, until the border guards said they had acted on their threat, and called in army helicopters from Batken. In fact, the chance of the border post having direct communication with the armed forces, or any telephone communication at all for that matter, is slim, and most of the Tajiks knew this.

“We knew they were bluffing,” Nasim says. But many of the Tajiks were unwilling to take the risk and call the Kyrgyz border guards’ bluff. The blockade ended unsuccessfully for the time, but not long after, the post was closed, and travel along the Isfara highway returned to normal. But not before the threat of military intervention had been on the horizon.

Today, tensions have cooled dramatically, primarily due to the cooperation among the villages in their work on the USAID PCI water project. Tajik villagers are optimistic that successful management of the water project will bring with it and end to the divisive conflicts and tensions that have troubled the cluster for the past thirteen years. The Kyrgyz have hope but admit that they remain skeptical, as they are the minority ethnicity, and at the tail end of the water users. But, now, their suspicions are more directed towards the Isfara *jamoat* and water department and their actions, rather than at their neighbours in Karabog. The *jamoat* has given assurances that water will be managed and distributed evenly among the villages, under the auspices of the regional water department. There are concrete plans for the maintenance of the irrigation system through a water users’ association, and licenses and certificates will be issued for every line attached to the main irrigation system. If promises are kept and the sustainability plan for the irrigation system is followed, the water project could be the first step forward for this international community long mired in infighting, and water itself, a unifying force and a catalyst towards peace.

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In front of the school where Nasimboi works, he carries a shovel and a recently unearthed apricot tree to a small patch of land overlooking the Isfarinka River. “There is a Tajik saying, ‘If you’ve got nothing to do, plant a tree,’” he says, setting the yearling—not much more than a two-meter-long stick—down on the dewy ground beside him. The ground is solid, but not frozen, from its winter hibernation, and Nasimboi breaks into it like a true man of the land, all the while talking and grunting with each new thrust into the earth. Nearby, children play all around, but not on, the football field in front of their school.

“There was going to be a football game this morning, but it was canceled because the field got flooded,” Nasim says without a trace of irony.

And the field is indeed completely flooded—from one goal to the other and beyond—in several centimeters of otherwise designated drinking water from the school’s well. He drives the spade into the ground with his right foot, fills the shovelhead with rocks and dirt, and deposits the hunks of earth to the side. He intermittently removes smooth rounded rocks from the sandy soil, tossing them aside, and then quickly returning to his digging. In short order, he has bored a small hole in the ground for the young tree, and settles it in the center of its new home. A boy from the school brings him a bucket of water and Nasim orders him to hold the tree steady in place, as Nasim replaces the earth around its roots. He steps back to examine its verticality, makes a couple of



adjustments to the side, and, satisfied, begins pouring water around the young tree. He smacks the newly wet earth around the apricot tree with his feet and the spade, and then hands the tool off to the young boy. Nasim briefly admires his work, and begins to head off down the hill toward the river, saying, “If there’s water, it’ll survive.”

## Appendix B Peaceful Communities Initiative Logical Framework

<b>GOAL: Reduced Potential for Conflict in the Ferghana Valley</b> <b>31 March 2004</b>				
OBJECTIVES	KEY OUTPUTS	MAJOR ACTIVITIES	INDICATORS	RESULTS
1. Improved cooperation between ethnic groups and across international boundaries.	1) Six social projects that provide a vehicle for communication across borders, between communities and ethnic groups, per regional cluster of PCI communities, per year. 2) One informal multi-ethnic, multi-CIG network per PCI region which jointly plans events to bring residents together on a frequent basis	1.1 CIGs will identify past social traditions and current social needs to develop programs and events designed to bring people together within their own community and with residents from neighboring communities 2.1 Assist CIGs in developing a network to jointly plan multi-community trans-border social events within the geographic area of their respective teams	A. Number of social projects involving more than two ethnic groups implemented by the end of each year B. Number of multi-community social projects that each informal network organizes and implements outside the project framework by the end of the project C. Percentage of infrastructure projects that provide a service to multi-ethnic populations or cross-border. D. Number of multiple-community infrastructure projects	A. 2002 – 18 interethnic 2003 – 46 interethnic 2004 – 16 interethnic B. 37 C. 90% D. 7
2. Increased community participation in identifying and resolving local priorities utilizing local resources and skills.	1) One informal network of community leaders (CIG) with experience bringing residents together and collectively solving problems per PCI community by the end of Year Two 2) CIGs will manage the implementation of least two infrastructure projects, addressing community identified priorities, per community by the end of the project 3) At least 25%	1.1 Creation of a demographically representative CIG through a transparent selection process 1.2 Build the capacity of CIG members to prioritize community problems and propose technical solutions in the form of single or multi-community infrastructure projects 2.1 Provide trainings to CIGs in all aspects of the project cycle 2.2 CIGs are responsible for the identification of local resources, design and implementation of technical	A. Average of infrastructure projects per community (output) B. Percentage of communities that have implemented at least two infrastructure projects C. Percentage of population that pays for the operation and maintenance of infrastructure projects with pricing mechanism. D. Number of formal associations (i.e. water users associations) operating at the end of the project.	A. 2 B. 67% C. 70% D. 7

<b>GOAL: Reduced Potential for Conflict in the Ferghana Valley</b> <b>31 March 2004</b>				
<b>OBJECTIVES</b>	<b>KEY OUTPUTS</b>	<b>MAJOR ACTIVITIES</b>	<b>INDICATORS</b>	<b>RESULTS</b>
	community contribution of materials and labor per infrastructure project 4) A transparent process of project selection and implementation per infrastructure project 5) A formal association for the long-term management of each infrastructure project with user fees for operation and maintenance.	projects 3.1 CIGs work with communities to identify, contribute and document the maximum amount of community resources 4.1 Build capacity of CIGs to design and facilitate a transparent project selection process 4.2 Build the capacity of CIGs to inform residents of resource allocation, management and pricing plans parallel to project implementation 5.1 CIGs will form independent associations to manage the sustainable operation of infrastructure projects with user fees for operation and maintenance.		

**GOAL: Reduced Potential for Conflict in the Ferghana Valley**

**31 March 2004**

<b>OBJECTIVES</b>	<b>KEY OUTPUTS</b>	<b>MAJOR ACTIVITIES</b>	<b>INDICATORS</b>	<b>RESULTS</b>
3. Increased community-based advocacy and government support of community driven initiatives.	1) Community leaders articulating and advocating community needs to local government. 2) Local government contribution of material resources to at least 50% of all PCI infrastructure projects. 3) Attendance of local government officials in at least 25% of all PCI social events.	1.1 Build capacity for CIG members on community advocacy via trainings, workshops and exchanges. 2.1 CIGs will solicit material contributions from local government for each infrastructure project 3.1 CIGs will invite local government representatives to attend all single and multi-community social events.	A. Percentage of PCI infrastructure projects that receive government contribution B. Percentage of PCI social events attended by local government officials C. Number of PCI community priorities addressed through CIGs advocating to local governments outside of the PCI project framework	A. 95% B. 70% C. 10

### Appendix C Infrastructure Projects (Completed or On-going Jan-Mar 2004)

#	Community	Project Title	Project Description	Start	Expected End	Community Contribution (%)	Total Project Cost (\$)	Number of Beneficiaries
1	Kyrgyz -Kyshtak, KYR	<b>Reconstruction of Roof School #14 named after Turgunov</b>	Roof rehabilitation	Aug/2003	March/2004	47%	20,936	1044
2	Ravot, TAJ	<b>Flame of Dream</b>	Build natural gas pipeline	Oct/2003	March/2004	49%	47,091	2310
3	Sharkabad, UZB	<b>Knowledge-Source of Development</b>	School construction	Oct/2003	May/2004	29%	35,640	260
4	Kayragach, KYR	<b>Rehabilitation of Irrigative Canal "Hojogum"</b>	Rehabilitation of irrigation canal "Hojogum"	Dec/2003	June/2004	21%	41,830	2133
5	Khushyar, UZB	<b>Children - Our Future</b>	Reconstruction of kindergarten into school	Dec/2003	May/2004	26%	15,230	3260
6	Jani-Abad, KYR	<b>Ray</b>	Construction of main electricity line and complete transformer substation KTP-250/10	Dec/2003	May/2004	21%	15,269	2020
7	Eshon, UZB	<b>Golden Water</b>	Construction of water system & repair of water supply main line	Dec/2003	May/2004	32%	24,271	1794
8	Kulunda, KYR	<b>Golden Step-II</b>	Build school for 320 places (second floor)	Feb/2004	Aug/2004	69%	48,895	640
9	Surh, TAJ	<b>Spring - II</b>	To provide electricity line for water pumps for 4 wells	Feb/2004	May/2004	26%	23,207	9000
10	Mingorik-Mingbulak, KYR	<b>Value of Potable Water in Min-Oruk</b>	To provide Min-Oruk and Min-Bulak villages with potable water	Feb/2004	Jun/2004	31%	30,545	430
11	Vorukh, UZB	<b>Flame of Dream</b>	Natural gas pipeline construction	Feb/2004	June/2004	35%	47,201	1235
12	Vorukh, UZB	<b>Flame of Dream</b>	Gas pipeline construction	Feb/2004	June/2004	40%	59,424	1235
13	Chorbog-Karabog TAJ; Dostuk, KYR	<b>Karobog Canal Reconstruction</b>	Reconstruction of inter-community canal Karobog and solve the shortage of irrigation water	Jan/2004	Feb/2004	26%	10,893	735
14	Kim, TAJ	<b>Warmth for Children!</b>	Reconstruction of existing heating system in school, kindergarten and polyclinic and connect them to main gas line	Jan/2004	Feb/2004	26%	16,049	300
15	Bakhmal, UZB	<b>Spring of Life</b>	Potable water system construction	Jan/2004	May/2004	42%	28,586	1159

#	Community	Project Title	Project Description	Start	Expected End	Community Contribution (%)	Total Project Cost (\$)	Number of Beneficiaries
16	Korayantak, UZB	<b>Construction of Goat Farm</b>	Build goat farm for 200 goats and purchase 120 goats	Jan/2004	May/2004	33%	9,015	1460
17	Bakhmal, UZB	<b>Spring of Life</b>	Potable water system construction	Jan/2004	May/2004	42%	28,622	1159
18	Buriboshi, UZB	<b>Blue Gold</b>	Gas pipeline construction	March/2004	June/2004	21%	33,621	2100
19	Katput, UZB	<b>Pump Station Construction</b>	Pump station construction	March/2004	May/2004	20%	26,218	675
20	Sogment, KYR	<b>Reconstruction of Sewing Factory into Maternity &amp; Health Clinic</b>	Reconstruction of sewing factory into maternity house & health clinic	Oct/2003	April/2004	27%	33,210	3458
21	Jar-Kyshtak, KYR	<b>Pure Water</b>	Reconstruction of water intake and construction of 3860m water pipeline	Oct/2003	May/2004	26%	10,003	2228
22	Jekke-Miste, KYR	<b>The ABC</b>	Reconstruction of abandoned kindergarten into school	Oct/2003	Feb/2004	20%	17,864	2200
23	Kara-Tokoy, KYR	<b>Fresh water for Kara-Tokoy</b>	Construct 5600m long water supply pipeline	Sept/2003	Mar/2004	29%	22,905	720
24	Boz-Adyr, KYR	<b>Children are Our Future</b>	Repair kindergarten, dormitory & cafeteria	Sept/2003	Feb/2004	25%	27,671	108

## Appendix D Social Projects (Completed Jan-Mar 2004)

#	Community	Project Title	Project Description	Start	End	Total Project Cost	Number of Beneficiaries
1	International, KYR; Ovchi, Kalacha, TAJ	"Public and Personal Hygiene"	Cleaning of the canal, construction of a new ambulance building, and basic health and hygiene care training for community members.	14/Jan/04	20/Feb/04	\$1,036	2500
2	International KYR, Ovchi TAJ	Culture Improves Life	Constructed wooden benches for spectators. Created theater troupe (wrote play and held performances)	15/Feb/04	15/Apr/04	\$420	250
3	Kayragach, KYR	We are together!	Celebrated Navruz	18/Mar/04	20/Mar/04	\$367	80
4	Kim, TAJ	In word "We" – hundred thousands "I"	Provide children with school books	12/Feb/04	12/Feb/04	\$216	80
5	Dostuk KYR, Chorbog- Karobog TAJ	My Childhood is My World	To hold drawing competition on the asphalt to increase communication of youth of two communities	22/Feb/04	22/Feb/04	\$283	60
6	Vorukh, UZB	Establishment of Open Women's Club	Establishment of Open Women Club	10/Jan/04	10/Jan/04	\$1,338	220
7	Jigdalik, Jangi Ravot, Ravat, TAJ and Bakhmal, Vorukh, Pakhtabuston UZB	Training on Fundraising for CIGs	Training on fundraising for CIGs from Jigdalik, Yangi Ravot, Ravot (TAJ) and Bakhmal, Vorukh, Pakhtabuston (UZB)	16/Feb/04	01/March/04	\$1,958	24
8	Pakhtabuston, Vorukh, Bakhmal UZB, Ravat, Jangi Ravat, Jigdalik	Day of Peace	Organize photo exhibition for veterans, contest of essays and newspapers among youth, marathon of peace, concert program and sport competitions.	21/Feb/04	21/Feb/04	\$1,258	1858
9	Sharkabad, UZB Kara-Tokoy, Boz- Adyr, KYR	Come on Girls	Contest for girls from 3 border communities	09/March/04	10/March/04	\$443	130
10	Sharkabad, Khushyar, UZB Charbak, Kara- Tokoy, Boz-Adyr, Sogment, KYR	Navruz-2004	Organize Navruz holiday for 6 cross-border Uzbek and Kyrgyz communities	18/March/04	18/March/04	\$614	2300
11	Khushyar, UZB Charbak, Sogment, KYR	Navruz - holiday of friendship	Organize Navruz holiday for 3 cross-border Uzbek and Kyrgyz communities	25/March/04	25/March/04	\$487	1000
12	Boz-Adyr, Kara- Tokoy, KYR, Sharkabad, UZB	Aigul - flower of friendship and peace	Organize youth meeting between ethnic Tajik and Kyrgyz communities	20/Apr/04	20/Apr/04	\$81	46



#	Community	Project Title	Project Description	Start	End	Total Project Cost	Number of Beneficiaries
13	Nayman, Buriboshi UZB, Jekke-Miste, Jar-Kyshtak, Jani-Abad, KYR	2nd meeting of youth leaders "Future is for leaders"	Arrange the meeting of youth leaders and teachers in Osh city for 27 active youth leaders from PCI team 4 communities	05/Jan/04	09/Jan/04	\$2,247	40
#	Community	Project Title	Project Description	Start	End	Total Project Cost	Number of Beneficiaries
14	Nayman, Buriboshi, Eshon UZB and Jekke-Miste, Jar-Kishtak and Jani-Abad KYR	Volleyball-2004	Organize volleyball tournament for girls teams from communities Nayman, Buriboshi, Eshon (UZB) and Jekke-Miste, Jar-Kishtak and Jani-Abad (KYR)	Jan/2004	Jan/2004	\$204	95
15	Nayman, Buriboshi, UZB Jekke-Miste, Jar-Kyshtak, Jany-Abad, KYR	Women are leaders	Organize 2-days leadership training for 24 women from 6 Uzbek and Kyrgyz communities	22/Jan/04	25/Jan/04	\$1,120	24
16	Nayman, Buriboshi, UZB Jekke-Miste, Jar-Kyshtak, Jany-Abad, KYR	Navruz-Sport Peace	Organize sport competitions and Navruz holiday for 6 cross-border communities	15/March/04	30/March/04	\$1,125	1000
17	Borbalyk, Kalaynav, Katput, Korayantak, UZB, Kyrgyz-Kyshtak, Kaytpas, KYR	Beauty saves the world	Women's Volleyball Tournament	15/March/04	17/March/04	\$927	110
18	Borbalyk, Kalaynav, Katput, Korayantak, UZB, Kyrgyz-Kyshtak, Kaytpas, KYR	Round Table	People from 6 cross-border communities discuss the peaceful way for solving problem of water using from Sokh-Shakhimardan canal	04/March/04	04/March/04	\$313	19
19	Borbalyk, Kalaynav, Katput, Korayantak, UZB, Kyrgyz-Kyshtak, Kaytpas, KYR	Equal to Equal-2	Organize training on 'Conflicts & communication" for 24 boys & girls from Uzbek and Kyrgyz communities	16/March/04	18/March/04	\$1,096	24

## Appendix E Media Results (Jan-Mar 2004)

#	Project Name	Project Type (S or I)	Community	Title of article or program	Television	Newspaper	Radio	Website	Date
1	PCI			We are all different and we are all equal!		Ata-Jurt, Isfana, KYR			08/Jan/04
2	Meeting of youth leaders " Future is for leaders-III"	S	Nayman, Buriboshi, Eshon, UZB and Jar-Kyshtak, Jani-Abad, Jekke-Miste, KYR	"Children of two neighboring countries learn international cooperation"	"Mulokot" TV, Kokand	Andijonnoma	Echo Dolini, (Rus & Uzb versions)		08/Jan/2004
3	Rehabilitation of irrigation canal "Hojogum"	I	Kayragach, KYR	Rehabilitation of irrigation canal allows solving two problems at once		Asia-plus, Dushanbe, TAJ		<a href="http://www.asiaplus.tajik.net">www.asiaplus.tajik.net</a>	23/Jan/04
4	"Let's unite through sport"	S	Malisu, Osh, KYR & Andijan, Namangan, Fergana, UZB	"Let's unite through sport"	Fergana TV-reporting				24/Jan/04
5	"Girls' Volleyball League"	S	Batken, Boz-Adyr, Sogment, Kara-Tokoy, KYR, Rovon, Sharkabad, Khushyar, UZB	International Volleyball Tournament		Vecherniy Bishkek, KYR		<a href="http://www.vb.kg">www.vb.kg</a>	27/Jan/04
6	"Girls' Volleyball League"	S	Batken, Boz-Adyr, Sogment, Kara-Tokoy, KYR, Rovon, Sharkabad, Khushyar, UZB	In Uzbekistan International Volleyball League has Started				KyrgyzInfo <a href="http://www.kyrgyzinfo.kg">www.kyrgyzinfo.kg</a>	27/Jan/04

#	Project Name	Project Type (S or I)	Community	Title of article or program	Television	Newspaper	Radio	Website	Date
7	"Peaceful Games" (intellectual quiz between 3 interethnic youth teams)	S	Kalaynav, Borbalyk, Katput, Korayantak, UZB and Kyrgyz-Kyshtak, Kaytpas, KYR	"Initiative becomes reality"	Andijan TV (oral information)		Echo Dolini		27/Jan/04
8	"Let's unite through sport"	S	Malisu, Osh, KYR & Andijan, Namangan, Fergana, UZB	"Let's unite through sport"	National TV "Yoshlar" - reporting				28/Jan/04
9	"Karobog canal reconstruction"	I	Chorbog-Karabog, TAJ Dostuk, KYR	Conflict will be solved in peaceful way		Varorud, Khujand, TAJ	Tiroz	<a href="http://www.varorud.org">www.varorud.org</a>	28/Jan/04
10	"Public and personal hygiene"	S	International, KYR; Ovchi, Kalacha, TAJ	Pure water - good neighbors		Leninabadskaya Pravda, Khujand, TAJ	Tiroz		28/Jan/04
11	Rehabilitation of irrigation canal "Hojogum"	I	Kayragach, KYR	Rehabilitation of irrigation canal will help to solve two problems at once		Leninabadskaya Pravda, Khujand, TAJ	Tiroz		28/Jan/04
12	Women's Open Club creating in Yangi-Ravot	S	Yangi Ravot, TAJ	Rural Women's Club Unites Women by Interests	TV "Guli Bodom"		Tiroz		29/Jan/04
13	PCI/team 2		Ravot, Yangi Ravot, Jigdalik, TAJ; Bakhmal, Vorukh, Pakhtabuston, UZB	Radio program #1 about PCI "The Way to Peace in Ferghana Valley"			Tiroz		3/Feb/04 10/Feb/04
14	PCI			Public Service Announcement on Tiroz Radio station in two languages			Tiroz		05/Feb/04 - 04/Apr/04

#	Project Name	Project Type (S or I)	Community	Title of article or program	Television	Newspaper	Radio	Website	Date
				(4 PSA)					
15	Rehabilitation of irrigation canal "Hojogum"	I	Kayragach, KYR	Irrigation Initiative		Vecherniy Bishkek, KYR		<a href="http://www.vb.kg">www.vb.kg</a>	12/Feb/04
16	PCI/team 6		Chorbog-Karabog, Surh, Kim, TAJ; Dostuk, Mingoruk-Mingbulak, KYR	Radio program #2 about PCI "The way to peace in Ferghana Valley"			Tiroz		17/Feb/04 24/Feb/04
17	"Flame of dream"	I	Ravot, TAJ	Flame of dream				<a href="http://www.centrasia.ru">www.centrasia.ru</a>	18/Feb/04
18	Day of Peace	S	Jigdalik, TAJ	Day of Homeland	TV "Guli Bodom"	Varorud, Khujand, TAJ			23/Feb/04
19	"Let's unite through sport"	S	Malisu, Osh, KYR & Andijan, Namangan, Fergana, UZB	"Let's unite through sport"	Fergana TV-reporting		Echo Dolini		23/Feb/04
20	Rehabilitation of irrigation canal "Hojogum"	I	Kayragach, KYR	Rehabilitation of irrigation canal will help to solve two problems at once		The information analytical bulletin "Development"			February, 2004
21	PCI/team 6		Chorbog-Karabog, Surh, Kim, TAJ; Dostuk, Mingoruk-Mingbulak, KYR	Radio program #3 about PCI "The Way to Peace in Ferghana Valley"			Tiroz		02/March/04 9/March/04
22	We are together!	S	Kayragach, KYR	Navruz Unites Nations		Varorud, Khujand, TAJ	Tiroz	<a href="http://www.varorud.org">www.varorud.org</a>	23/March/04

#	Project Name	Project Type (S or I)	Community	Title of article or program	Television	Newspaper	Radio	Website	Date
23	"Children-are our future"	I	Boz-Adyr, KYR	All the best is for children!	KTR channel, KYR	Batken-Taani, Batken, KYR	Salam Radio station, Batken, Azattyk radio, Central Asia		31/March/04
24	"Women Volleyball Tournament "	S	Nayman, Buriboshi, Eshon, UZB and Jar-Kyshtak, Jani-Abad, Jekke-Miste, KYR	"Sport is uniting people"			Echo Dolini		12/March/04
25	"Peaceful Games-2" (intellectual quiz between 3 interethnic youth teams)	S	Kalaynav, Borbalyk, Katput, Karayantak, UZB and Kyrgyz-Kyshtak, Kaytpas, KYR	"Initiative becomes reality"	"Mulokot" TV, Kokand		Echo Dolini		01/March/04
26	"Equal to Equal"(educational trainings youth to youth)	S	Kalaynav, Borbalyk, Katput, Karayantak, UZB and Kyrgyz-Kyshtak, Kaytpas, KYR	"Youth - is our future"	Fergana TV-oral information		Echo Dolini		15/March/04
27	"Navruz-holiday of peace and friendship"	S	Nayman, Buriboshi, Eshon, UZB and Jar-Kyshtak, Jani-Abad, Jekke-Miste, KYR	"Navruz-holiday of peace and friendship"		Andijonnoma, Iqbol; Informational Agency " AKIpress", Bishkek, KYR; Varorud, TAJ			26/March/04

## Appendix F List of USAID's Peaceful Communities Initiative Communities

USAID/PCI Communities				
№	Community	Country	Team	Population
1	Ovchi	Tajikistan	1	3891
2	International	Kyrgyzstan	1	3193
3	Kalacha	Tajikistan	1	6057
4	Kayragach	Kyrgyzstan	1	2369
5	Pakhtaabad	Tajikistan	1	817
6	Kulunda	Kyrgyzstan	1	7938
7	Pakhtabuston	Uzbekistan	2	1900
8	Vorukh	Uzbekistan	2	2400
9	Jangi Ravot	Tajikistan	2	2000
10	Jigdalik	Tajikistan	2	1800
11	Ravot	Tajikistan	2	2400
12	Bakhmal	Uzbekistan	2	4500
13	Boz -Adyr	Kyrgyzstan	3	1890
14	Kara- Tokoy	Kyrgyzstan	3	722
15	Sharkabad	Uzbekistan	3	2190
16	Sogment	Kyrgyzstan	3	1582
17	Charbak	Kyrgyzstan	3	356
18	Khushyar	Uzbekistan	3	5500
19	Jar –Kyshtak	Kyrgyzstan	4	1800
20	Jani- Abad	Kyrgyzstan	4	4200
21	Buriboshi	Uzbekistan	4	1802
22	Nayman	Uzbekistan	4	1050
23	Jekke- Miste	Kyrgyzstan	4	2313
24	Eshon	Uzbekistan	4	1820
25	Kaytpas	Kyrgyzstan	5	1600
26	Korayantak	Uzbekistan	5	1302
27	Kyrgyz- Kyshtak	Kyrgyzstan	5	3209
28	Borbalyk	Uzbekistan	5	7133
29	Katput	Uzbekistan	5	4775
30	Kalaynav	Uzbekistan	5	3395
31	Mingorik-Mingbulak	Kyrgyzstan	6	430
32	Dostuk	Kyrgyzstan	6	450
33	Surh	Tajikistan	6	10000
34	Chorbog-Karabog	Tajikistan	6	300
35	Gulistan	Tajikistan	6	1849
36	Kim	Tajikistan	6	1700
<b>Total:</b>				<b>100663</b>